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THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN
ALASKA AND THE DESIGN
PROFESSIONAL EXCEPTION
ASHLEY K. SUNDQUIST ∗
ABSTRACT
The economic loss doctrine has prevented countless plaintiffs from recovering
their economic losses in tort. However, over the last several decades, numerous
courts have found exceptions to this doctrine. Alaska currently provides two
important exceptions: the independent duty exception and the design
professional exception. These two exceptions as applied provide for inconsistent
results which create liability for design professionals and cut off liability for
non-design professionals. Providing the same approach and analysis for all
professionals creates greater consistency and predictability and provides an
opportunity for design professionals to limit their exposure to negligence
claims.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sally invests her entire life savings into a business. The business hires
an attorney. The attorney provides negligent legal advice because he is
distracted during the meeting. Sally follows the negligent legal advice,
resulting in the failure of the business and the loss of her entire life
savings. Sally has no contract remedies available to her because she is not
in privity of contract with the attorney, so her only recourse is in tort. In
Alaska, Sally will not be able to recover her economic losses in tort because
the economic loss doctrine bars her recovery against non-design
professionals.
In a different scenario, Sally is a sub-subcontractor on a construction
project with no direct contract with the architect. The architect on the
project creates faulty designs and is negligent in developing the plans it
provides to Sally. Sally follows the architect’s design, but various issues
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arise due to design defects and Sally incurs significant costs as a result. In
this scenario, Sally will be able to recover her economic loss against the
architect because Alaska recognizes an exception to the economic loss
doctrine for design professionals.
These two scenarios demonstrate that, although Sally incurs a purely
economic loss in both situations, she will only be able to recover those
losses against design professionals. Alaska’s exception to the economic
loss doctrine for design professionals opens the door to unlimited liability
to design professionals for parties not in privity of contract. Additionally,
it prevents individuals such as Sally from recovering economic losses
from other professionals. If, instead, the same analysis applied to all
professionals, parties would have results that are more consistent, the
liability of design professionals could be limited, and parties could
recover economic losses from non-design professionals. This Article
explores this alternative.
Part II examines the economic loss doctrine generally and
specifically to Alaska and discusses some of the exceptions to the
economic loss doctrine including the independent duty exception and the
design professional exception. Part III argues that the Alaska courts
should apply a consistent rule for all professionals and not just design
professionals in order to provide better consistency and limit liability.

II. ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE & EXCEPTIONS
The economic loss doctrine prevents individuals from recovering
purely economic losses in tort if the losses do not stem from physical
injury or property damage. 1 The seminal case for this doctrine is East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 2 where the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that “a manufacturer in a commercial
relationship has no duty under either negligence or strict productsliability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.” 3 This doctrine
has changed significantly over the last fifty years and various courts have
numerous exceptions and different interpretations of what is permissible
recovery.
States that follow the economic loss doctrine and bar recovery for
economic losses in tort only permit recovery under a breach of warranty
claim. The rationale for this approach is that parties who are in privity of
contract can utilize warranty remedies and those who are not in privity
1. Christopher Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract
Warranty Law from Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591, 591 (1995).
2. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
3. Id. at 871. Such product damage is “most naturally understood as a
warranty claim.” Id. at 872.
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of contract did not have the opportunity to bargain with the manufacturer
or seller for any type of protection from defective products. 4
Alaska has adopted the economic loss doctrine, thereby preventing
individuals from recovering economic loss in tort. 5 However, Alaska and
various courts around the country allow for different exceptions to the
economic loss doctrine. To better understand these differences, this Part
will highlight the general consensus from various jurisdictions and then
highlight Alaska’s interpretation of these exceptions.
Potentially Dangerous Exception
Some states allow economic recovery in tort for strict liability claims
when the product poses a threat of bodily harm. 6 These courts argue that
the plaintiff should be able to recover economic losses because there was
real potential that individuals or other property could have been injured
as a result of the defect. 7 These courts find that allowing this exception
incentivizes manufacturers to ensure that their products are safe to
consumers. 8
Alaska follows this exception and allows recovery for economic loss
in tort when faced with the potential for danger to persons or other
4. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 555–56 (2009).
5. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286, 291 (Alaska
1976) (holding that a consumer could not recover for purely economic losses
under a strict liability claim and instead must bring a claim for breach of
warranty).
6. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co., 517 A.2d 336, 345 (Md. 1986) (holding that plaintiff could recover
the cost of fixing damaged property when there were no actual injuries but a
serious risk of injury); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199,
1210, amended sub nom. Wash. Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 779 P.2d 697
(Wash. 1989) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he fact that a hazardous product
defect has injured only the product itself, and not persons or other property, is
properly regarded as a ‘pure fortuity’. Thus, the same remedy is made available
for this sort of injury as would be available if the product defect had injured
something or someone else.”).
7. See Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 834 P.2d 980, 985 (Okla.
1992) (“[A] defective product is still dangerous even though it did not reach its
full potential for harm by causing personal injury or damage to other property.”);
Council of Co-Owners Atlantis, 517 A.2d at 345 (Md. 1986). The Maryland Supreme
Court stated:
[W]hether a duty will be imposed in this type of case should depend
upon the risk generated by the negligent conduct, rather than upon the
fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage. Where the
risk is of death or personal injury the action will lie for recovery of the
reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition. Id.
8. See N. Power & Eng’g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 328–
29 (Alaska 1981).
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property. 9 In Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 10
the Alaska Supreme Court stated:
when a defective product creates a situation potentially
dangerous to persons or other property, and loss occurs as a
result of that danger, strict liability in tort is an appropriate
theory of recovery, even though the damage is confined to the
product itself. 11
Under this theory, the plaintiff must show (1) that the loss was
foreseeably caused by a dangerous defect and (2) the dangerous
circumstance was the cause in fact for the loss.. 12
“Other Property” Exception
In East River, the Supreme Court distinguished between two types of
damages. First, damage to the property itself was held to be barred by the
economic loss doctrine and not recoverable. 13 By contrast, damage done
to “other property” was held to not be barred by the economic loss
doctrine and was therefore recoverable. 14 However, the Court left unclear
what constitutes “other property,” making it difficult for courts to
determine which types of damages are recoverable in tort as opposed to
restricted to contract remedies. 15
The U.S. Supreme Court provided some guidance on the issue in
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co, 16 where the Court addressed
whether a product that is added to the initial product is considered “other
property” and therefore recoverable in tort, or is considered part of the
product itself and therefore not recoverable in tort. 17 In that case, Saratoga
Fishing Co. brought a claim against J.M. Martinac & Co. for the loss of its
fishing vessel and other equipment on the boat after a fire in the engine
room. 18 The Court held that the extra skiff, nets, spare parts, and other

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870
(1986) (stating that when damage is done to the product itself and does not harm
any person or other property, then the loss is purely economic and should be
remedied in contract law).
14. Id.
15. See N. Power & Eng’g Corp., 623 P.2d at 330 (failing to distinguish between
the property itself and other property and holding that tort liability is appropriate
for damage confined to the product itself).
16. 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
17. Id. at 879.
18. Id. at 877.
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equipment which were added to the ship after the ship was delivered by
the manufacturer were “other property” and were therefore recoverable
under a tort theory. 19 The Court reasoned that a subsequent user who may
purchase a used product does not have the opportunity to contract with
the manufacturer and obtain the same warranties as the original
purchaser, and therefore should be able to recover in tort when no privity
of contract exists. 20
Courts around the country have tried to draw the distinction
between the product itself and other property when a product is part of
an integrated system. This can be particularly challenging in the
construction context. Some courts have held that damage to a component
part of a system is damage to the product itself and is not damage to
“other property.” 21 Other courts, however, have held that the individual
parts of the construction are all “other property.” 22
Alaska has attempted to draw a distinction between property
damage, which is recoverable in tort, and economic loss, which is not
recoverable in tort. In Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co., 23 the Clouds
purchased a mobile home which was manufactured by Kit
Manufacturing Co. 24 The rug padding provided with the purchase of the
mobile home caught fire and destroyed the mobile home and its
contents. 25 The Alaska Supreme Court held that, although it is difficult to
determine the difference between property damage and economic loss,
because the fire was the result of a “sudden and calamitous occurrence,”
the loss to the property and the belongings were property damage and

19. Id.
20. Id. at 882.
21. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 174 (Wis. 2005) (“If the
‘product’ at issue is a defective component in a larger ‘system,’ the other
components are not regarded as ‘other property’. . . .”).
22. See Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc., 8 A.3d 766, 776 (N.J. 2010) (holding that
the economic loss rule did not bar plaintiff’s claims for negligence because the
exterior vinyl siding is not an “integral part of the structure itself” but was
“distinct from the house”); Harris v. Suniga, 180 P.3d 12, 17 (Or. 2008) (holding
that plaintiff’s claim for negligence caused by dry rot of an apartment building
was damage to “other property” and not barred by the economic loss doctrine);
Am. Stores Props., Inc. v. Spotts, Stevens & McCoy, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that a retaining wall was not “other property” in the
context of the construction of a distribution center and therefore the negligence
claims regarding its failure were barred by the economic loss doctrine);
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims
Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 244 (Utah 2009) (holding that the foundation and roofs
of a townhome are integrated products and therefore damage to them is not
considered damage to “other property”).
23. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
24. Id. at 249.
25. Id.
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therefore recoverable in tort. 26 The Alaska Supreme Court has further
held that when a defective component part causes damage to another
component part, this does not constitute damage to “other property” and
is therefore not recoverable in tort. 27
In Shooshanian v. Wagner, 28 the Alaska Supreme Court again
addressed the distinction between property damage versus economic
loss. In that case, the Shooshanians brought a strict liability claim to
recover replacement costs against a contractor who insulated walls with
a toxic spray that caused allergic reactions among the family. 29 The court
focused its attention on whether or not there was a dangerous defect, and
held that the Shooshanians could recover for the replacement costs for the
property damage due to the harmful effects of the product that made the
product “dangerously defective.” 30
Independent Duty Exception
Sometimes the duties parties have to each other go beyond the four
corners of the contract. Some courts have allowed an exception to the
economic loss doctrine by focusing on the source of the duty of care and
allowing parties to recover economic losses in tort when a tort duty exists
independent from a duty that may be specified in a contract. 31 The South
Carolina Supreme Court articulated it well by stating:
[t]he question, thus, is not whether the damages are physical or
economic. Rather the question of whether the plaintiff may
maintain an action in tort for purely economic loss turns on the
determination of the source of the duty plaintiff claims the
defendant owed. A breach of a duty which arises under the
provisions of a contract between the parties must be redressed
under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of a duty

26. Id. at 251.
27. N. Power & Eng’g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 330
(Alaska 1981).
28. 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983).
29. Id. at 457.
30. Id. at 464.
31. See Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000)
(“The key to determining the availability of a contract or tort action lies in
determining the source of the duty that forms the basis of the action.”); Bilt-Rite
Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 288 (Pa. 2005)
(agreeing that recovery for purely economic loss is dependent upon the source of
the duty owed to the plaintiff); see also Craig K. Lawler, Foreseeability and the
Economic Loss Rule–Part II, 33 COLO. LAW. 71, 71 (arguing that the “source of the
duty” approach is something of a “magic bullet”).
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arising independently of any contract duties between the parties
however, may support a tort action. 32
Based on this exception, state courts have identified various causes
of action unbarred by the economic loss doctrine, including fraud, 33
conversion, 34 and negligent misrepresentation. 35
When parties bring a claim for negligence, however, further analysis
is required to determine whether the exception applies. First, the court
will determine whether a duty exists in the contract itself or by statute,
regulation, the parties’ preexisting relationship, or case law. 36 If a duty
does not arise under those sources, the courts will consider various
factors. 37 The foreseeability of the harm factor tends to carry great weight.
Recovery is often permissible for economic losses solely because the harm
was foreseeable. 38
The Alaska Supreme Court first addressed this exception in the
economic loss context in Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College. 39 Sheldon
Jackson College needed a drainpipe cleaned and called Mattingly’s

32. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding,
Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995).
33. See Cunningham v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 872, 887 (N.D. Iowa
1999) (holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar fraud claim); Highland
Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. LifeCare Holdings, Inc., 2008 WL 3925272, at
*15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss claims for fraud and
fraudulent misrepresentation because a duty to disclose would arise regardless of
whether the parties had a contractual relationship); Eastwood v. Horse Harbor
Found., Inc., 241 P.3d 1256, 1263 (Wash. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs to sue to recover
purely economic loss for fraud, but barring negligence claims); Kaloti Enters., Inc.
v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W.2d 205, 219 (Wis. 2005) (holding that fraud in the
inducement is not barred by the economic loss doctrine).
34. Alex Hofrichter, P.A. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, P.A., 710 So. 2d 127, 129
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a claim for conversion and civil theft is not
barred by the economic loss doctrine due to its independent action from the
contract).
35. Lawler, supra note 31, at 71.
36. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319, 322 (Alaska 2005).
37. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555
(Alaska 1981) (utilizing factors to determine whether defendant was negligent);
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (adopting a factor test to determine
whether an independent duty exists to parties not in privity of contract).
38. See A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973) (“[A] third
party general contractor, who may foreseeably be injured or sustained an
economic loss proximately caused by the negligent performance of a contractual
duty of an architect, has a cause of action against the alleged negligent architect,
notwithstanding absence of privity.”); Kristek v. Catron, 644 P.2d 480, 483 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1982) (“[A] purchaser of a residence may recover property damage
caused by negligence of its builder despite the lack of any contractual relationship
with the builder.”).
39. 743 P.2d 356, 358 (Alaska 1987).
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company to perform the work. 40 The college had excavated and braced a
trench to gain access to the drainpipe and, while Mattingly’s employees
were working on the pipe, the trench collapsed causing injury to his
employees. 41 Mattingly brought a claim for negligence seeking recovery
for his economic losses. 42 The Alaska Supreme Court relied on the
analysis provided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in People Express
Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 43 which stated:
that a defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures
to avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from
physical injury to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an
identifiable class with respect to whom defendant knows or has
reason to know are likely to suffer such damages from its
conduct. A defendant failing to adhere to this duty of care may
be found liable for such economic damages proximately caused
by its breach of duty. 44
On that basis, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the contractor had
set forth sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent economic loss and
that the superior court should not have dismissed the case. 45
Although the foreseeability of the harm factor is important in
determining an independent duty, 46 Alaska courts have stated that it is
not dispositive, and thus other factors must be considered. 47 Different
jurisdictions tend to offer slightly different factors, but Biakanja v. Irving 48
is still recognized as establishing the foundational factors that most courts
consider when determining whether an independent duty exists to
parties not in privity of contract. 49 The factors include:

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
44. Id. at 263.
45. Mattingly, 743 P.2d at 361.
46. See R.E. v. State, 878 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Alaska 1994) (identifying
foreseeability as the most important of the established factors in determining duty
under Alaskan law); Div. of Corr., Dept. of Health & Soc. Services, v. Neakok, 721
P.2d 1121, 1125 (Alaska 1986) (citation omitted) (“The most important single
criterion for imposing a duty of care is foreseeability.”).
47. See, e.g., Geotek Alaska, Inc. v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 354 P.3d 368, 377
(Alaska 2015) (holding that foreseeability of the harm is not itself enough to create
a duty in tort); Mesiar v. Heckman, 964 P.2d 445, 450 (Alaska 1998) (holding that no
duty existed despite plaintiff’s injury being foreseeable).
48. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
49. Pegeen Mulhern, Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the Land: A Tort
Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 85, 96–97
(1990).
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the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,
and the policy of preventing future harm. 50
Other states, including Alaska, have adopted this exception and
utilize similar factors which include the following
[t]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing
a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved. 51
Alaska courts have used the factors in several different cases, which
are important to note in deciphering whether an independent duty exists.
The first case where the Alaska courts utilized the independent duty
factors in the economic loss context was Mesiar v. Heckman. 52 In that case,
Heckman brought a claim for economic losses due to negligent use of
sonar to count the salmon run that resulted in reduced fishing limits,
causing economic losses to commercial fisheries. 53 Because the parties
were not in privity of contract, no statute, regulation, or preexisting
relationship created a duty; therefore the court used the D.S.W. factors to
determine whether a tort recovery was possible under the independent
duty exception. 54 The first factor the court considered, per Mattingly, was
foreseeability of the harm. 55 The court agreed that Heckman correctly
asserted that negligently using the sonar counting process could
foreseeably cause harm to Yukon River fisheries. 56 However, in the
court’s analysis regarding whether Heckman could proceed in his claim,
it determined that practically any decision made by the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game has adverse effects on parties, and that
50. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
51. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 628 P.2d 554, 555
(Alaska 1981) (citing Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (Cal. App. 1976)).
52. 964 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1998).
53. Id. at 448.
54. Id. at 450.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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imposing liability for those decisions would expose the State to litigation
in nearly every decision it makes. 57
Next, the court considered the moral blame factor. While arguably
almost all negligence claims are morally blameworthy, the court
discussed that cases that create risk of death or serious injury typically
fulfill this requirement. 58 As the harm was primarily economic, moral
blameworthiness was not a prominent factor. 59 In determining whether
the policy of preventing future harm was a factor creating a duty, the
court mirrored the reasoning it used in analyzing the foreseeable harm
factor and dismissed this as a factor in favor of Heckman. 60
The court then determined the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty. 61 Again the court
discussed that allowing Heckman to recover would open the floodgates
of litigation against state agencies for negligent management decisions. 62
Finally, the court looked at the availability of insurance and concluded
that the State would most likely be unable to find or afford insurance. 63
Thus, although two of the factors weighed in favor of Heckman, the court
concluded that the factors did not warrant a finding of duty and thereby
held that the State did not owe an independent duty of care to Heckman. 64
After Mesiar, the Alaska Supreme Court stressed the importance of
the D.S.W. factors in Geotek Alaska, Inc. v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., 65
where it analyzed whether a general contractor owed an independent
duty of care to a sub-subcontractor to ensure the subcontractor made
payment. 66 Geotek, the sub-subcontractor, argued that Jacobs’ awareness
that Geotek may not have been paid by the subcontractor made it a
foreseeable plaintiff that could incur economic losses, which should be
recoverable under Mattingly. 67 However, the court clarified its holding in
Mattingly and stated:
Mattingly did not create a new duty in tort, let alone one so broad
as to provide a negligence cause of action for any foreseeable
economic harm caused by another’s lack of due care. Mattingly

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id.
354 P.3d 368 (Alaska 2015).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 377.
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simply expanded liability in tort to include purely economic
losses . . . . 68
Although the court did not go through the individual factors because
the parties did not analyze them, the court noted that most factors cut
against the existence of an independent duty. 69 The court briefly stated
that the negligence did not create any risk of death or physical injury and
therefore had little blameworthiness, and that the plaintiff did not
provide any public policy justifications for allowing recovery. 70
In a recent federal district court case applying Alaska law, the court
applied the D.S.W. factors to a construction project. 71 The Municipality of
Anchorage (MOA) brought claims to recover economic losses against
Integrated Concepts and Research Corporation alleging negligence,
professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation in regards to
the construction project. 72 In analyzing MOA’s negligence claim, the court
utilized the D.S.W. factors. 73
First, the court considered whether the harm was foreseeable and
concluded that it knew, or should have known, that its action could have
affected MOA. 74 Second, the certainty of the harm weighed in favor of the
defendant, because of disagreement among the parties as to whether
injury occurred at all. 75 Third, the court found that the connection
between the damages and the negligence was too remote because many
other intervening individuals were involved in the project. 76 Fourth, the
court found moral blame weighed in favor of the defendant because the
risk of personal injury or harm was not significant. 77 Fifth, the prevention
of future harm favored the defendant because the parties had the ability
to protect against future harm by contracting or refusing to work
together. 78 Sixth, the court considered the burden on the defendant and
the community if a duty existed. 79 Relying on Geotek, where the court
stated that imposing a duty would subject contractors to additional
liability with whom they are not in privity of contract, the court held this

68. Id.
69. Id. at 379.
70. Id.
71. Municipality of Anchorage v. Integrated Concepts & Research Corp., 2016
WL 6471010 (D. Alaska Oct. 31, 2016).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id. at *7–*8.
74. Id. at *7.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *8.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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factor in favor of the defendant as well. 80 Last, the court found MOA’s
rejection of additional insurance weighed in favor of defendant. 81
Although the most important factor, foreseeability, fell in favor of the
plaintiff, the court held that the defendant was entitled to summary
judgment since all other factors fell in its favor. 82
Alaska and other jurisdictions have also created an exception for
duties that are outside of the duties found within a contract. These courts
allow recovery in tort when an independent duty exists based on various
factual and policy considerations. In addition to the independent duty
exception, Alaska courts have recognized an exception to the economic
loss doctrine for design professionals, to which this Article now turns.
Professional Negligence and the Design Professional Exception
Although courts have allowed an exception for an independent
duty, courts have more recently moved in the opposite direction in the
professional context, believing that parties should be held to their
contracts so as to better allocate risk and provide greater certainty and
predictability. 83 Therefore, courts are limiting the reach of this exception
or eliminating it altogether. However, unlike the independent duty
exception, courts under professional malpractice cases do not consider
the factual and policy factors in deciding whether to allow an exception.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, courts across the
country have expanded the economic loss doctrine into professional
malpractice. As with the case law on the independent duty exception,
courts offer various interpretations of what types of claims are barred and
which types of professionals are covered. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court has held that the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d
986, 992 (Wash. 1994) (“If tort and contract remedies were allowed to overlap,
certainty and predictability in allocating risk would decrease and impede future
business activity.”); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint
Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Wyo. 1996) (“In deference to the abilities of
sophisticated businessmen to provide contractual remedies in their business
dealings, [another] court held that the contractor’s claims against the architect
must fail under the economic loss doctrine.”).
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claims against lawyers and accountants, 84 but it does bar tort claims
against architects and engineers. 85
One scholar has articulated that the discrepancy between the two
types of professions is that architects and engineers document their duties
in a contract typically in relation to a structure they plan to build, while
lawyers and accountants will have less predictable duties. 86 A contract is
thus unable to capture the “extracontractual duty” that lawyers and
accountants often have. 87
Other states take an all or nothing approach on whether professional
claims are barred. For example, Minnesota utilizes the economic loss
doctrine to bar claims for recovery in commercial transactions, but allows
recovery in tort for negligently performing professional services. 88 Other
courts have made a blanket assertion that the economic loss doctrine does
not apply at all to malpractice cases. 89
Alaska first considered whether a claim for professional negligence
may be brought based on purely economic losses in St. Denis v.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 90 In that case, the plaintiff
purchased a home and later discovered a faulty roof, a problem not
disclosed at the time of purchase. 91 The plaintiff brought a claim against
the government for the cost of repairs incurred to fix the roof. 92 The court
held that the plaintiff could not bring a professional negligence claim for

84. See Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Ill. 1992) (Miller, C.J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is singularly inappropriate to attempt to apply the economic
loss . . . doctrine to attorney malpractice actions.”); Congregation of the Passion,
Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503, 515 (Ill. 1994) (holding
that the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort claims for accountant
malpractice).
85. See 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass’n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd.,
555 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1990) (holding that a claim for purely economic loss was not
recoverable in an architectural malpractice case); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC
Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197 (Ill. 1997) (holding that the economic loss doctrine
bars recovery in tort for engineering malpractice).
86. Mark C. Friedlander & Andrea B. Friedlander, Malpractice and the
Moorman Doctrine’s “Exception of the Month”, 86 ILL. B.J. 600, 602–03 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Steven Lesser & Amy Koltnow, Liability of Construction Design
Professionals and the Economic Loss Rule, Brief, 29 A.B.A. WINTER BRIEF 50, 51 (2000).
89. See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995) (holding that a contractor could recover
against an engineer for purely economic loss); Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 627
(Mass. 1998) (holding the economic loss doctrine inapplicable in legal malpractice
cases); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (holding that the economic loss rule was not applicable to a malpractice
case).
90. 900 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Alaska 1995).
91. Id. at 1195.
92. Id.
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real property when she only incurred economic loss, stating that if the
Alaska courts will not permit an extra contractual remedy for economic
loss in a products liability claim, then the court will not permit recovery
for economic loss in a real estate transaction. 93
Alaska courts have come to a somewhat different conclusion in the
professional design context. The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that
design professionals have a tort duty “to exercise reasonable care, or the
ordinary skill of the profession, for the protection of anyone lawfully
upon the premises whose injury is reasonably foreseeable as the result of
negligent design, plans, orders, or directions.” 94 In addition, the Alaska
courts have allowed parties to sue design professionals in tort for purely
economic losses due to a professional’s malpractice when no privity
exists. 95 However, a party who has significant control over the design
professional, such as owners, are not considered design professionals and
therefore parties must recover under a contract theory. 96 Although Alaska
has not addressed whether individuals can recover for economic losses in
tort when the parties are in privity of contract, other states have allowed
the parties to recover in tort because a special relationship exists. 97
Various courts across the nation have different interpretations of
what types of professionals may be sued in tort for purely economic loss.
Alaska has allowed an exception to the rule for an independent duty and
for design professionals, but has not allowed an exception for other
professionals, as other state courts have permitted.

93. Id. at 1200.
94. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 217 (Alaska 1982) (holding that a party could
bring a negligence claim against Engineering Science of Alaska for negligence
based on substandard work).
95. See Clark v. City of Seward, 659 P.2d 1227, 1229–31 (Alaska 1983)
(allowing a city to pursue a counterclaim against an engineer that it had
previously hired but subsequently replaced with another engineer).
96. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 856 P.2d 766,
772 (Alaska 1993).
97. See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) (“In most instances, a negligence
action will not lie when the parties are in privity of contract. When, however, there
is a special relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the injured party not
arising in contract, the breach of that duty of care will support a tort action.”); see
also Carl J. Circo, Placing the Commercial and Economic Loss Problem in the
Construction Industry Context, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 77 (2007) (“Clients [of
design professionals] may assert malpractice claims either in contract or in tort,
and they often proceed under both theories.”).
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III. ALASKA NEEDS TO REVISE ITS APPROACH TO PROFESSIONAL
MALPRACTICE
As discussed in Part II, Alaska adopted the economic loss doctrine
for product liability claims, thereby preventing individuals from bringing
tort claims for purely economic losses. However, throughout the last few
decades Alaska has provided exceptions to this overarching rule. These
exceptions have created inconsistencies in the professional negligence
context, and should be revised so as to provide better guidance and more
consistent treatment of similarly situated parties.
As mentioned above, Alaska follows the independent duty
exception for economic loss. Thus, an individual can bring a claim for
economic losses when there is an independent duty outside of the duties
found in a contract. Similarly, design professionals owe a duty in tort
outside of a contract in a professional context. These exceptions are
important in that they are the only venue for recovery for third parties
who are not in privity of contract.
These two exceptions to the economic loss rule are one and the same.
The independent duty doctrine states “[a] defendant owes a duty of care
to take reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing economic
damages . . . [plaintiffs] with respect to whom defendant knows or has
reason to know are likely to suffer such damages from its conduct.” 98 The
design professional exception states “[i]t is the duty of an engineer or
architect to exercise reasonable care . . . for the protection of anyone
lawfully upon the premises whose injury is reasonably foreseeable as the
result of negligent design, plans, orders, or directions.” 99 Both require
individuals to avoid harm, and act reasonably to a foreseeable plaintiff.
In that sense, it seems that a court’s analysis for a negligence claim
against design professionals is essentially applying the independent duty
rule, but foregoing the application of the lengthy D.S.W. factor test. The
real inconsistency lies in the fact that Alaska courts do not apply this same
analysis to non-design professionals. Instead, non-design professionals
such as real estate agents, attorneys, and corporate directors are protected
by the economic loss doctrine and do not have claims brought against
them for purely economic loss in tort. 100 Although Alaska has not
98. Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 360 (Alaska 1987).
99. Moloso, 644 P.2d at 217.
100. See Lee Houston & Assoc., Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 855 (Alaska 1991)
(holding that a six-year statute of limitations applied to the case because plaintiff’s
claim against a real estate agent is found in contract and not in tort because a
professional service relationship is based in contract); Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v.
White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981) (holding that a negligence claim alleging breach
of duty of the attorney-client relationship followed the statute of limitations for
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addressed whether a party can bring a claim against a non-design
professional utilizing the independent duty exception, in Lee Houston &
Associates v. Racine, 101 the Alaska Supreme Court held that professional
negligence claims are found in contract but not in tort, thereby closing any
opportunity for this argument. 102 This inconsistency results in more
liability to design professionals and no liability to non-design
professionals.
No clear policy rationale exists for the differentiation. However,
Alaska courts can take two approaches in remedying this disparity of
treatment. First, courts should recognize that, while the D.S.W. factors
affect design and non-design professionals differently, case-by-case
analysis still leaves room for imposing independent duties to both. Using
future harm and moral blameworthiness factors will typically favor
plaintiffs against design professionals, but in cases with non-design
professionals, the factors will likely favor the non-design professionals.
Both factors evaluate the harm and the risk of death or physical injury. 103
Design professionals are responsible for the overall structure of a
building, and small details such as drawing plans that utilize the wrong
screws could have detrimental effects on the safety of a building resulting
in serious injury or death. On the other hand, the harm caused by nondesign professionals typically will be economic in nature since attorneys
and accountants provide advice and their negligence typically does not
result in a risk of death or physical injury.
Although these two factors vary in their outcome, there are still five
other factors the courts must consider when determining whether an
independent duty exists. Other factors such as foreseeability of the harm
to the plaintiff and degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury
need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and thus, it is impossible to
make an overall assumption as to whether design professionals and nondesign professionals would come to different conclusions.
The other approach the Alaska courts could take on this issue is to
hold that a special relationship exists with design professionals. As
mentioned previously, Alaska courts utilize the D.S.W. factors only after
tort and not contract), overruled by Lee Houston, 806 P.2d 848; Bibo v. Jeffrey’s Rest.,
770 P.2d. 290, 296 (Alaska 1989) (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty by a
corporate director is a breach of implied contract).
101. 806 P.2d 848.
102. Id. at 848. However, the court has not addressed whether third parties not
in privity of contract can bring tort claims against non-design professionals under
this theory. Id.
103. See Geotek Alaska, Inc. v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 354 P.3d 368, 379
(Alaska 2015) (internal citations omitted) (“First, as contrasted to negligence
creating a risk of death or physical injury, we have ascribed little blameworthiness
to ordinary negligence that merely causes economic harm.”).
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they have established that no duty exists in statute, regulation, the parties’
preexisting relationship, or in case law. 104 Thus, design professionals
arguably owe a separate duty based on a special relationship between the
engineers and other parties such as subcontractors, thereby forging the
D.S.W. factor analysis. This argument is flawed, however, as one can
argue that project owners are not held liable though they have a “special
relationship” with subcontractors. 105 Similarly, as Justice Burke argued in
his dissent in Lee Houston, the relationships between attorneys and clients
are special relationships that create a duty imposed by society going
beyond the contract, and hence should be resolved in tort instead of
contract. 106
Because of the flaws in adopting a “special relationship” rule, Alaska
courts should apply the same test to both design professionals and nondesign professionals. Currently, parties can recover against design
professionals, exposing them to unlimited liability. Although the
language of the design professional exception requires the harm to the
plaintiff be foreseeable, the foreseeability factor is not dispositive and
other factors must be considered. 107 The Alaska Supreme Court in Mesiar
even stated that the foreseeability of economic harm is not enough and
denied plaintiff’s claim arguing that any decision made by the State could
cause a foreseeable plaintiff economic harm. 108 In that sense, there is little
difference between the State in Mesiar and design professionals.
Engineers and architects can make negligent decisions causing all parties
economic harm, yet they are on the hook for all foreseeable plaintiffs
while parties like the State are not.
In a similar sense, protecting non-design professionals against
liability negates the purpose of the independent duty exception. The
independent duty exception allows parties to recover when a duty exists
outside of the contract. Although the Alaska Supreme Court in Lee
Houston focused on the issue of statute of limitations, it made a blanket
assertion that professional negligence claims are sound in contract and
not in tort and did not apply the D.S.W. factor analysis in coming to this
104. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319, 322 (Alaska 2005) (“In deciding whether a
defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, we first determine whether
a duty is imposed by statute, regulation, contract, undertaking, the parties’
preexisting relationship, or existing case law.”).
105. See Lee Houston, 806 P.2d 848, 854–55 (holding that there was contract
liability for parties in professional service relationships, but not liability in tort).
106. Id. at 856–57 (Burke, J., dissenting).
107. See Geotek, 354 P.3d at 377–78 (holding that foreseeability of the harm is
not enough by itself to create a duty in tort); Mesiar v. Heckman, 964 P.2d 445, 450,
452 (Alaska 1998) (holding that no duty existed despite plaintiff’s injury being
foreseeable).
108. Mesiar, 964 P.2d at 450.

34.1 ARTICLE - SUNDQUIST (DO NOT DELETE)

84

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/1/2017 2:25 PM

Vol. 34:1

conclusion. 109 Courts may also find that non-design professionals are
liable after applying the D.S.W. factors. 110 Thus, the courts should apply
the D.S.W. factors to all professional negligence cases and determine
whether an independent duty exists outside of the contract, as opposed
to imposing liability on design professionals alone without
individualized analysis of the factors.

IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the economic loss doctrine helps to limit recovery in strict
liability and negligence claims and provide consistency for contracting
parties. However, allowing various exceptions to the rule creates
problems among contracting parties, particularly in the professional
negligence context. The Alaska courts have adopted several exceptions to
the economic loss doctrine including the independent duty exception and
the design professional exception. The design professional exception
causes increasing liability to design professionals and cuts off liability
completely to non-design professionals causing inconsistent results to
similar parties. If the Alaska courts want to continue to follow the
independent duty doctrine, they should apply the exception across all
professions and utilize the factors to limit liability to design professionals
and expose non-design professionals to liability when it meets the
balancing factor test.

109. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 856.
110. Other courts have utilized the same factors to reach the conclusion that
non-design professionals are liable. See Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima Cty., 558
P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. App. 1976) (holding an attorney liable to a third party after
applying the Biakanja factors).

